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TWO THEORIES IN REGARD TO THE IMPLIED
POWERS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
In his lecture upon "Man as a Member of a Confedera-
tion," James Wilson, Lecturer on Law to the College of
Philadelphia, which was soon to be united with the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, said, "Great minds frequently unite,
without intercommunication, upon the same great object."'
The reference was to Henry the Fourth of France and
Elizabeth of England. To Elizabeth had come the vision
of a united Europe; to Henry she had communicated the
vision, and his mind, quick and receptive as hers was fertile,
had seized upon the thought, and to Sully he had intrusted the
working out of the practical details of a scheme both came
to believe might be accomplished. A dream of great minds,
destined not to be brought to any visible, concrete, embodi-
ment in that world for which they dreamed and labored.
But Wilson believed that in this new world to which he had
come, this America he had learned to love, their "sublime
system" had been "effectually realized." In this federal
republic he saw the dream of Elizabeth and Henry brought
into complete realization. For he believed that in the union
of states under a federal constitution there had come into
being a system of government such as had never before been
tried in the known history of the world.
Mr. Wilson was a signer of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, .an ardent, untiring supporter of the struggling
confederacy during the war, and one of the most eminent
and active members of the convention which framed the
Constitution of 1787. Prominent in the debates, a member
of the committee on detail, it is probable that as fully as any
person in the United States he understood the document he
had helped to form. It should not therefore be considered as
presumptuous to claim for him a priority in certain ideas
which have since been widely disseminated by another great
'Wilson's Works, vol. I, p. 335.
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mind. Such minds, as we have seen, "frequently unite with-
out intercommunication." It is no disparagement to the one
that the other has reached a like level where he has been able
to gain a similar breadth of view. To those who may not
be able to reach this level, it is no unpleasing thought that
upon these uplands of the intellect the one does not dwell
alone in the loneliness of his high thought, but that it there
has the inspiring companionship of an equal mind.
John Marshall has been honored as the moulder of our
thought upon the Constitution; and the honor has been
well bestowed. But because he reached the high levels of
constitutional interpretation it is not a necessary consequence
that he should stand alone upon those levels. We have,
perhaps, a little, in these latter days, fallen into a habit of
thinking that because "the expounder " lived and enunciated
his principles in years succeeding those which saw the form-
ing of the Constitution, the fathers, lacking the light he has
thrown upon it, did not wholly comprehend the work of their
own minds. Or, understanding it, would have given to it
a narrower interpretation than, under the leadership of
Marshall, it has since received. To any one who has made
a study of the life and work of James Wilson, it must become
apparent that he, at least, understood and interpreted the
Constitution with as broad a mind, as clear a knowledge, a
vision as far-seeing, as ever has been brought to its con-
sideration. It may be truly said that he not only thoroughly
understood it after it was formulated and had taken its
place among the governments of the world, but there is not
lacking proof that he had analysed and mentally digestee
the principles upon which it would be necessary to base its
interpretations, before the idea of a federal constitution had
fully taken shape..
The case of McCulloch v. Mar)yand2 has often been cited
as the cornerstone of the constitutional fabric in regard to -
the implied powers of the constitution, and as "probably
Marshall's greatest opinion." "If we regard at once the
greatness of the qttestions at issue in the particular case,
24 Wheaton, 316.
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the influence of the opinion, and the large method and clear
and skilful manner in which it is worked out; there is nothing
so fine as the opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland. The ques-
tions were, first, whether the United States could constitu-
tionally incorporate a bank; and, second, if it could, whether
a state might tax the operation of the bank." 3 This case
was decided by Judge Marshall in 1819. In 1785, nearly a
quarter of a century earlier, but when Marshall was thirty
years of age, and at a time when he was a member of the
Virginia legislature, thus being in touch with the thought
of the time on all important questions, James Wilson pub-
lished his "Considerations on the Bank of North -America."
The Bank of North America had been granted a charter
of incorporation by an act of Congress, in 1781, and the
Legislature of Pennsylvania had passed a supplementary Act,
in 1782. The publication of these considerations was occa-
sioned by a bill introduced into the Legislature of Penn-
sylvania, to repeal the act incorporating the bank. The
question Wilson had to consider was, as he states it, "Had
the United States in congress assembled a legal and consti-
tutional power to institute and organize the Bank of North
America, by a charter of incorporation? The question in
McCulloch v. Maryland, as stated by Marshall was, "Has
congress the power to incorporate a bank?" Marshall had
to interpret the Constitution of 1787, Wilson the Articles of
Confederation. But they had to discuss the same principles
and to apply them to a similar state of facts.
The first objection to the power thus claimed was that-
in one case by the Articles of Confederation, in the other
by the Constitution-certain express powers had been
granted, or delegated, by the sovereign states to the national
government, and that the power to incorporate a bank was
not one of them. Wilson conceded that it was true that-
"By the second article of the confederation, 'each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not, by the confederation, expressly delegated to
'Dillon. Marshall: Life, Character and Judicial Services. vol. i,
Address oi Professor Thayer, p. 234.
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the United States in congress assembled' If, then, any of the states
possessed, previous to the confederation, a power, jurisdiction, or right,
to institute and organize, by a charter of incorporation, a bank for
North America; in other words commensurate td the United States,
such power, jurisdiction, and right, unless expressly delegated to Con-
gress, cannot be legally or constitutionally exercised by that body."
"But, we presume, it will not be contended, that any or each of
the states could exercise any power or act of sovereignty extending
over all the other states, or any of them; or, in other words, incorporate
a bank, commensurate to the United States."
"The consequence is, that this is not an act of sovereignty, or a
power, jurisdiction, or right, which, by the second article of the con-
federation, must be expressly delegated to congress, in order to be
possessed by that body."'
Marshall argued as follows:
"This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated
powers. The principle that it can exercise only the powers granted
to it would seem to be too apparent to have required to be enforced
by all those arguments which its enlightened friends, while it was
depending before the people, found it necessary to urge . . . . If
any one proposition could command the universal assent of mankind,
we might expect that it would be this-that the government of the
Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of
action. This would seem to result necessarily from its nature. It
is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all; it repre-
sents all; and acts for all. Though any one state may be willing to
control its operations, no state is willing to allow Others to control
them . . . . The government of the United States, then, 'though
limited in its powers, is supreme; and its laws when made in pursuance
of the Constitution, form the supreme law of the land, 'anything
in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwith-
standing."'
"Among the enumerated powers, we do not find that of establish-
ing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no phrase in the
instrument which, like the Articles of Confederation, excludes inciden-
tal or implied powers; and which requires that everything granted
shall be expressly and minutely described." •
This last paragraph shows the limitation of Marshall's
thought on the subject. In finding a basis for his argument
he went as far back as the needs of the specific occasion
demanded, and he went no further. The ground on which
he took his stand was sufficient for the foundation of the
edifice he was to erect, and it seemed sufficiently firm. But
he did not reach quite to the basic rock which it would be
found necessary to reach in order to sustain the greater
'Wilson's Works, vol. 3, P. 405.
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 405, 406.
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fabric which was to come, and the ground which he covered
was later found not sufficient for the expanding greatness of
the structure."
Having thus decided that the United States in congress
assembled had only delegated powers, or that it was a
government of enumerated powers, both Marshall and
Wilson took the next step necessary to demonstrate that,
nevertheless, the power to incorporate a bank was within
the scope of the Constitution.
Marshall argued that-
A government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so
vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their
execution.
And upon this necessity in the national government for the
means to carry out the powers either expressly or impliedly
granted to it he based his argument for the right of congress
to incorporate a bank.
"On what foundation does this argument rest? On this alone: The
power of creating a corporation is one appertaining to sovereignty, and
is not expressly conferred on Congress. This is true. But all legis-
lative powers appertain to sovereignty. The original power of giving
the law on any subject whatever is a sovereign power; and if the
government of the Union is restrained from creating a corporation,
as a means for performing its functions, on the single reason that the
creation of a corporation is an act of sovereignty: if the suficiency
of this reason be acknowledged there would be some difficulty in sus-
taining the authority of Congress to pass other laws for the accom-
plishment of the same objects."
"The government which has a right to do an act, and has imposed
on it the duty of performing that act, must, according to the dictates
'For example it has been considered that the peaceful acquisition
of territory, a national banking system, or the acts making anything
other than gold and silver coin a legal tender, are not properly included
within the scope of Marshall's argument.
"New states must be formed and established: their extent and
boundaries must be regulated and ascertained. How can this be done,
unless by the United States in congress assembled? .... I have
asked, How can new states, which are bodies politick, be formed,
unless by the United States in congress assembled? Fact, as well as
argument, justifies my sentiment on this subject The conduct of con-
gress has been similar on similar occasions. The same principles
have directed the exercise of the same powers . . . . It will be
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of reason, be allowed to select the means; and those who contend that
it may not select any appropriate means, that one particular means of
effecting the object is excepted, take upon them.elves the burden of
establishing that exception."'
"It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers,
to insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial
execution. This could not be done by confining the choice of means
to such narrow limits as not to-leave it in the power of Congress to
adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to
the end." • • • . The clause' is placed among the powers of Con-
gress, not among the limitations on those powers . .. . Its terms'
purport to enlarge, not to diminish, the powers vested in the govern-
ment. It purports to be an additional power, not a restriction on
those already granted. .-. . The result of the most careful and
attentive consideration bestowed upon this clause is, that if it does
not enlarge, it cannot be construed to restrain, the powers of Congress,
or to impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment
in the selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional
powers of the government. If no other motive for its insertion can
doubts respecting the right to legislate on that vast mass of incidental
powers which must be involved in the Constitution, if that instrument
be suggested, a sufficient one is found in the desire to remove all
be not a splendid dauble.""We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are
limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think
the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national
legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the
powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable
that body to perform the high duties assigned, to it in the manner
most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appro-
priate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not pro-
hibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional." 1@
The last words are the familiar household words of our
constitutional law. Though said to have been " originated
by Mr. Hamilton and paraphrased by Chief Justice Mar-
shall" 11 the paraphrase owes its vitality to Marshall's use
of it. Hamilton's or Marshall's, it was a good working
difficult, I believe, to urge against the power of congress to grant a
charter to the Bank of Noth America any argument which may not,
with equal strength and fitness, be urged against the power of that
body to form, execute, and promulgate a charter of compact for the
new states" Wilson's Works vol. 3, pP. 408, 410, 411. Phila. i804.
'McCulloch v Maryland, 4 Wheaton, 409, 410.
Congress shall have power . . . . "to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper to carry into execution" the powers of
the government.
"McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, pp. 42o, 421.
'Patterson. United States and the States under the Constitution,
p. 16 2d ed. Philadelphia r9o4-
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theory. Whether Marshall himself would have agreed to
the extension of that theory over subjects it has since been
made to cover, can only be a matter of speculation to be
answered in accordance with the private views of the inves-
tigator.
Jefferson, although Marshall's phrasing of the thought
was still in the future, found the real weakness of the idea,
in that it throws us back upon the need of determining what
ends are legitimate. He says-
"It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase-that of
instituting a congress with power to do whatever would be for the
good of the United States . .. . It was intended to lace them up
strictly within the enumerated powers, and those without which, as
means, these powers could not be carried into effect It is known
that the very power now proposed as a means, was rejected as an end by
the convention which formed the constitution. A proposition was made
to them, to authorize Congress to open canals, and an amendatory one
to empower them to incorporate. But the whole was rejected; and
one of the reasons of objection urged in debate was, that they then
would have power to erect a bank, which would render great cities,
where there were prejudices and jealousies on that subject, adverse to
the reception of the constitution."
Jefferson would, in principle, have objected to Mr.
Wilson's line of argument, although he could not have made
the specific objection, made here, for Wilson's argument,
though leading to quite as broad an interpretation of the
Constitution, rested upon fundamentally different grounds.
Hamilton and his disciple Marshall, however, were more
solicitous for the strength of the central government than
they were for securing to the states their individual rights.
Not so Wilson. He was a strong believer in the state
governments. His experience during the existence of the
Confederacy had taught him to desire, to see the necessity of,
a strong national government. He invented a phrase,
" Federal Liberty," to express his feelings in regard to the
national government, but that phrase had as an essential
ingredient the idea of the states joining in the common
government for the freedom of all. In the course of the
debates in the Federal Convention he often spoke of the
' Elliott's Debates, vol. 4, Appendix, p. 61o.
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necessity for preserving the state governments; he observed
that-
"By a national government, he did not mean one that would swallow
up the state governments, as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen.
He was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He thought,
contrary to the opinion of Coldnel Hamilton, that they might not only
subsist, but on friendly terms with the former. They were absolutely
necessary for certain purposes, which the former could not reach.
"The states should resign to the national government that'part, and
that part only, of their political liberty, which placed in that government,
will produce more good to the whole than if it had remained'in the
several states. While they resign this part of their political liberty, they
retain the free and generous exercise of all their faculties as states,
so far as it is compatible with the welfare of the general and super-
-intending confederacy." 1,
Marshall did not consider the power of establishing a cor-
poration,--in the specific case, a bank,-to be an end in-
tended by the Constitution. If it had been, he argues, it
would have found a place among the enumerated powers of
the government.
"But being considered merely as a means, to be employed only for
the purpose of carrying into execution the gven powers, there-could be
no motive for particularly mentioning it."
'9
The necessity for a bank was also advanced as an argu-
ment by both Marshall and Wilson, the latter citing authority
after authority to show that all governments and financiers
had found some such means necessary in carrying on the
great operations of their governments. He showed the deep
distress into which the United States had fallen during the
-war,-the hopes of the enemy that the finances would fail.
"This was the source of our fears, as well as the hopes of our
enemies. By this thread our fate was suspended. We watched it
with anxiety; we saw it stretched and weakened every hour; the death-
ful instrument was ready to fall upon our heads; on our heads it must
have fallen, had not publick credit, in a -moment when it was about
to break asunder, been entwined and supported by the credit of the
bank." "' Marshall said, "All those who have been concerned in the
"Elliott's Debates, vol. 5, P. 212.
"Wilson's Works, vol. 3, P. 288. Philadelphia 18o4.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, p. 422.
' Wilson's Works, vol. 3, P. 425.
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administration of our finances have concurred in representing its impor-
tance and necessity; and so strongly have they been felt, that states-
men of the first class, whose previous opinions against it had been
confirmed by every circumstance which can fix the human judgment
have yielded those opinions to the exigencies of the nation." IT
Taking up again Wilson's argument in favor of the bank,
we find him arguing as follows :"'
"Though tfie United' States in congress assembled derive from the
particular states no power, jurisdiction, or right, which is not expressly
delegated by the confederation, it does not thence follow, that the
United States in congress have no other powers, jurisdiction, or rights,
than those delegated by the particular states."
"The United States have general rights, general powers, and general
obligations, not derived from any particular states, taken separately;
but resulting from the union of the whole; and, therefore, it is provided,
in the fifth article of the confederation, that for the more convenient
management of the general interests of the United States, 'Delegates
shall be annually appointed to meet in congress."
"To many purposes, the United States are to be considered as one
undivided, independent nation; and as possessed of all the rights, and
powers, and properties, by the law of nations incident to such."
"Whenever an object occurs, to the direction of which no particular
state is competent, the management of it must, of necessity, belong
to the United States in congress assembled. There are many objects
of this extended nature. The purchase, the sale, the defence, and the
government of lands and countries, not within any state, are all included
under this description. An institution for circulating paper, and
establishing its credit over the whole United States, is naturally
ranged in the same class."
"The Act of Independence was made before the Articles of Con-
federation. This act declares, that 'these United Colonies' (not enum-
erating them separately) 'are free and independent states, they have
full power to do all acts and things which independent states may, of
right, do.' "
"The confederation was not intended to weaken or abridge the
powers and rights to which the United States were previously entitled.
It was not intended to transfer any of those powers or rights to the
particular states, or any of them. If, therefore, the power now in
question was vested in the United States before the confederation; it
continues vested in them still. The confederation clothed the United
States with many, though, perhaps, not with sufficient powers; but of
none did it disrobe them."
"It is no new position, that rights may be vested in a political
body, which did not previously reside in any or in all the members of
that body. They may be derived solely from the union of those
members. (2 Burl. 42) 'The case,' says the celebrated Burlamaqui,
'is here very near the same as in that of several voices collected
together, which, by their union, produce a harmony, that was not to be
found separately in each.'"
"tMcCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, pp. 422, 423.
'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, p. 421.
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"A number of unconnected inhabitants are settled on each side of a
navigable river. It belongs to none of them; it belongs to them all,
for they have nothing in common; let them unite; the river is the
property of the united body.""
The argument here made is plain, logical, and, it is sub-
mitted, conclusive. Had it been given to the world in an
opinion delivered before a court of law, necessarily to be
consulted before other questions of a similar nature could
be passed upon, it seems that it might have laid to rest many
vexed questions which have been, and to some extent still
are, unsettled. Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Mary-
land has been called a restatement from the supreme bench
of this argument.20
The ground taken, the inferences drawn, do, indeed, seem
similar; there is even a familar Sound about some of the
phrasing, about the grouping of ideas in some of the sen-
tences; but, as has been before intimated, Wilson's argument
is wider in its scope, and includes an important element not
to be found in Marshall's much more labored and elaborate
argument. Mr. Wilson argued that the states retained all
the powers not expressly delegated. That if any power was
possessed by a state before the union, and was not expressly
delegated, it did not pass to the congress of the United
States. But, he argued, if the power in question was not
possessed by any state before the union, it was not a power
which must be delegated in order to be possessed by that
body. It was a power not derived from any particular
state, or from all the particular states taken separately, but
resulting from a union of the whole. When, therefore an
object occurred, not within the power of any particular state,
the management of it must, of necessity, belong to the United
States in Congress assembled. As no state, at any time, had
possessed any power over the other states, either singly or
taken together, it must follow that all the powers which were
needed by congress in regard to national concerns, or con-
cerns which included more than one state, or involved con-
"Wilson's Works, vol. 3, PP. 4o6, 408. Philadelphia i8o4.
' Andrews, Wilson's Works, vol. i, p. 556, Note. Chicago, i896.
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trol of matters outside the bounds of any one state, must
be vested in the United States by the constitution. It is very
probable that Wilson's familiarity with the civil law gave
him this clearer view of the position of the states to the nation
than was taken by those unfamiliar with that branch of the
law. He speaks of his position as no new one, and does not
seem to feel that he is taking a position in any way radical or
unusual. Marshall had, so far as is known, no knowledge
of the civil law, and could, therefore, derive no help from it.
Although from certain inward indications, as we have
noticed, it seems likely that he had read the " Considera-
tions," it is not probable that his mind had done more than
assimilate unconsciously certain phrasings and, possibly, a
part of the argument. It seems certain that he did not
remember the line of argument upon which Wilson based his
decision. For, in his decision, we see his mind laboring
with the task he has in hand; we do not so much listen to
the argument as we see him shaping it out for himself. We
may see him emerge triumphantly from the difficulties which
surround him, but we feel that we have watched a struggle.
But in Wilson's argument we find no trace of a struggle.
There is a sense of certainty from the moment -of the
opening paragraph. The matter has been met and con-
quered before we are admitted upon the scene; the labor has
been accomplished and we see only the smooth, polished, per-
fect result.
The likeness between the arguments, of Marshall and
Wilson are seen in the working out of the idea; the unlike-
ness is found in the grounds upon which the reasoning is
based. As we have seen, both were profoundly convinced
that there was an absolute necessity to uphold the power to
incorporate; that this was a power given by the Constitution
on the one hand, by the Articles of Confederation on the
other. Both sought for a constitutional basis for the power
they believed so necessary for the carrying on of the govern-
ment Marshall maintained that it would have been impos-
sible that "everything granted shall be expressly and min-
utely described," but that there was nothing which, "like
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the Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied
powers." He seemed to feel, however, that this doctrine of
the implied powers might make too wide a breach in the Con-
stitufion, for he adds, a little later, "it can never be pretended
that these vast powers" (those enumerated) "draw after
them others of inferior importance, merely because they are
inferior. Such an idea can never be advanced." He feels
that he must not admit the power of congress to incorporate
under the Constitution, on the ground that this power is an
inferior one, as that might lead to results in the future he
might have to regret; that it might admit as constitutional
powers which might not be, as he felt this power was, a
necessity to the government. And then he finds his solution
and the rest of the argument is comparatively easy. The
power of incorporation was not -of sufficient dignity to
be included among the enumerated powers, but it could not
be considered as implied for that reason; he admits that;
but, he says, the congress must have the necessary means of
carrying out the powers granted it. The power to incor-
porate is a necessary means for carrying out the ends intend-
ed to be gained through the enumerated powers. Therefore,
as a means, and as a means only, the -pocer is a constitu-
tional power. It was a wise, a conservative, an ingenious,
method, of upholding the power, and, as he hoped, of escap-
ing the undesirable consequences. Unfortunately for his
hopes, the interpreters of his decision have, probably with-
out being conscious that they were doing so, and using his
arguments to sustain their own; uncovered the sophism that
lay concealed in its logic. They have thus carried the
decision to the same length it would have gone, had he
frankly discarded his doctrine regarding the "means," and
rested his argument for the constitutionality of the power
solely on the grounds that it was, one of the unexpressed
or implied powers. By inventing his subsidiary doctrine
he seems simply to have added one more step to the reason-
ing, and those who have come after him, while apparently
adopting his theory, have found it as easy to claim all
desired powers as means, as they would have found it to
226 IMPLIED POWERS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
claim them as ends inferior and not therefore not expressed.
They seem to have found as great a freedom as they would
have had under the doctrine he rejected. He has not in fact
saved the Constitution from the wider construction he
seems to have been desirous to avoid.
Marshall's argument would not have admitted the power
to incorporate a bank to be constitutional under the articles
of confederation. There is nothing in the Constitution, he
thinks, which excludes the implied powers, "like the Articles
of Confederation." Wilson had to deal with the Articles of
Confederation, and he was still able to uphold the power; and
he did it by enunciating a doctrine which at once delivered
him from the embarrassments felt by Marshall; which
would, indeed, open the door for as wide a construction as
would the doctrine of implied powers in its broadest accepta-
tion, but which he yet felt to be in no way an infringement
upon the reserved powers of the states. He gave, as it were,
to the confederated bodies, a soul, whose powers were in no
way derived from the separate states; whose existence was
the result solely of their union; whose life was dependent on
their life; and therefore he felt no fear on its part of action
from it inimical to the life of those states upon which its
own life depended.
He states his doctrine simply, clearly, without circumlocu-
tion, or any show of feeling that he was admitting too much,
or opening the door to unforseen evils. He felt no difficulty,
and there is no sense of any in reading his argument.
Wilson's theory may not be considered sound. It may
be, as Marshall felt -the plain doctrine of implied powers
would be, a very wide contruction of the Constitution. But
did it not lead to the same conclusion? Did it admit more
than Marshall's doctrine of the-means-to-the-end theory has
been made to admit, by the conscious or unconscious ignor-
ing of the limitations he tried to set, by treating his deci-
sion as if it admitted powers as wide as those fully and
frankly claimed by Wilson?
It may be that one reason for the similarity of result,
through a really profound difference of reasoning, in the
argument of Marshall and of Wilson, is that they both seem
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to have had the same idea as to the ultimate seat of the
sovereignty of our government. Marshall notes that the
opponents of the bank claimed that the powers of the general
government were delegated by the states, "who alone are
truly sovereign;" and must be exercised in subordination to
the states," who alone possess supreme dominion." (21) He
replies that "it would be difficult to sustain this proposi-.
tion."..."The government of the union, then,...is,
emphatically, and truly, a government of the people.. In
form and in substance it emanates from them. Its powers
are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on
them, and for their benefit." 22 He does not, however,
ever .appear to have expressed the thought as strongly as
Wilson, who reiterated his opinions on this point time after
time, and upon every occasion when he felt that there
could by any possibility be any misunderstanding of the
matter. He was perhaps more definite in his remarks before
the Pennsylvania convention in 1787, than anywhere else.
He asks on one occasion-
"s Upon what principle is it contended that the sovereign power
resides in the state governments? . . . My position is that the
sovereignty resides in the people; they have not parted with it;
they have only dispensed such portions of power as were conceived
necessary for the public welfare. This Constitution stands upon this
broad principle .. . . When the principle is once settled that the
people are the source of authority, the consequence is, that they may
take from the subordinate governments powers with which they have
hitherto intrusted them, and place those powers in the general govern-
ment, if it is thought that it will be productive of more good. They
can distribute one portion of power to the more contracted circle,
called state governments; they can also furnish another proportion to
the government of the United States . . .. How comes it, sir, that
that these state governments dictate to their superiors-to the majesty
of the people? .. . . I have no idea that a safe system of power
in the government, sufficient to manage the general interests of the
United States, could be drawn from any other source, or vested in
any other authority, than that of the people at large; and I consider
this authority the rock on which this structure will stand." '
Neither Marshall nor Wilson feared the phrases, "Sover-
eign government," " Sovereign states." The states had such
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheaton, p. 402.
Elliott's Debates, vol 4, Appendix, p. 61o.
'Elliott's Debates, vol. 2, p. 444.
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power as the people gave them; the nation had such power as
the people-not the states-gave it; the Constitution was
supreme over both, but the people could change, amend,
even do away with the Constitution, if in the exercise of their
sovereignty it should seem to them the proper thing to do.
May it not, therefore, be, that from this cause their minds
were free to act upon such constitutional questions as this
we have just examined without fear that they should infringe
too far upon the prerogatives of the states ? That they should
be building up a too-important power above and beyond
them. Was it not, perhaps, the constant irritation caused
by the ever-recurring debate about, the sovereign states;
the jealousy and the ill-feeling that the dislike of parting
with any power caused in the several states, that made
Wilson speak so strongly in his lecture upon" Law and
Obligation," 23 in regard to Blackstone's definition of sov-
ereignty? He had felt the evil of this false position of the
law. He had felt that if this country was to proceed upon
the only principle possible to her in the position she had
taken, it must be understood, and very thoroughly under-
stood, that sovereignty was the prerogative of the people,
solely and unalterably. This it was that gave him such a
firmness, such a clearness in his discussion of this and similar
questions, it seems beyond doubt. This being so, it may not
be inappropriate to reproduce here a part of his argument
before the convention of Pennsylvania, words which helped
to secure the adoption of that constitution to which he was
so devoted.
After stating the aims of the constitutional convention of
1787; the desire to frame for the consideration of their
constituents, one federal and national constitution, "whose
beneficence and energy would pervade the whole union, and
bind and embrace the interests of every part," he says:
"We are now naturally led to examine the means by which they
pr6pose to accomplish this end. This opens more particularly to our
view the important discussion before us. But previously to our enter-
'Wilson's Works, vol. i, p. 55. Phila. i8o4.
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ing upon it it will not be improper to state some general and leading
principles of government, which will receive particular applications
in the course of our investigations."
"There necessarily exists in every government a power from which
there is no appeal, and which, for that reason, may be termed supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable. Where does this power reside? To
this question, writers on different governments will give different
answers. Sir William Blackstone will tell you that in Britain, the
power is lodged in the British parliament; that the parliament may
alter the form of the government; and that its power is absolute and
without control. The idea of a constitution, limiting and superintend-
ing the operations of legislative authority, seems not to have been
accurately understood in Britain. There are, at least, no traces of
practice conformable to such a principle. The British constitution is
just what the British parliament pleases. When the parliament trans-
ferred legislative authority to Henry the Eighth, the act transferring
it could not, in the strict acceptation of the term, be called uncon-"
stitutional."
"To control the power and conduct of the legislature by an over-
ruling constitution, was an improvement in the science of government
reserved to the American States."
"Perhaps some politician, who has not. considered with sufficient
accuracy, our political systems, would answer, that in our govern-
ments, the supreme power was vested in the constitutions. This
opinion approaches a step nearer the truth, but does not reach it.
The truth is, that, in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power remains in the people. As our constitutions are
superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our con-
stitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this last instance, is much
greater; for tfie people possess," over our constitutions, control in act,
as well as right."
"The consequence is, that the people may change the constitutions,
whenever, and however they please. This is a right, of which no
positive institution can ever deprive them." ....
"Oft have I viewed with silent pleasure and admiration the force
and prevalence, through the United States, of this principle that the
supreme power resides in the people,.and that they never part with it.
It may be called the panacea in politics. There can be no disorder in
the community but may receive a radical cure. If the errour be
in the legislature, it may be corrected by the constitution; if in the
constitution, it may be corrected by the people. There is a remedy,
therefore, for every distemper in government, if the people are not
wanting to themselves. For a people wanting to themselves, there is
no remedy; from their power, as we have seen, there is no appeal; to
their errour, there is no superiour principle of correction." ....
"If we take an extended and accurate view of it, we shall find the
streams of power running in different directions, in different dimen-
sions, and at different heights, watering, adorning, and fertilizing the
fields and meadows through which their courses are led; but if we
trace them, we shall discover that they all originally flow from one
abundant fountain. In this Constitution, all authority is derived from
THE PEOPLE." U
Margaret C. Klingelsmith
= Wilson's Works, vol. 3, pp. 291, 295. Phila. I804.
